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The last fifty years have witnessed large secular increases in educational attainment and R&D intensity. The fact that these trends have not stimulated more
rapid income growth has been a persistent puzzle for growth theorists. We construct a model of endogenous economic growth in which income growth, R&D intensity, and educational attainment depend on the complexity of new technologies.
An increase in complexity that makes passive learning more difficult, induces increases in R&D and education, alongside a decline in income growth. Our explanation also predicts a concurrent rise in the skill premium.
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inequality, technological complexity.
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Figure 1 contains some US aggregate time-series that are now very familiar.
Panel (a) shows a dramatic rise since 1950 in the intensity of R&D, whether
measured as a proportion of the labor force or as a proportion of aggregate expenditure. Panel (b) shows a similar marked increase in educational attainment.
One may quibble about the significance of these data. R&D has no doubt become
more formal and, consequently, more broadly defined in the official statistics, and
much of the increase in educational attainment may be a consumption good that
contributes little to measured productivity growth (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare,
1997; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999). Nonetheless, given the strength of the
observed trends, the underlying real changes in R&D and educational attainment
must be considerable. However, panels (c) and (d) show that, despite these dramatic changes in the key inputs of the knowledge production function, there has
been no corresponding rise in either per capita income growth or labor productivity growth. To the contrary, long-run income growth has declined somewhat over
this period.
Despite the familiarity of these data, growth theorists have made little progress
explaining them. Because R&D intensity and years of schooling cannot rise forever, we must be observing transitional dynamics. Yet most growth models predict that per capita income growth will rise along a transition path characterized
by rising inputs into the knowledge-creation process. In one notable exception,
Jones (2002) has shown that the data are consistent with out-of-steady state predictions of a semi-endogenous growth model in which new ideas are shared across
countries. In his model, per capita income growth is proportional to population
growth in the steady state, but can be sustained at a constant, higher, rate when
input intensity is rising. We learn much from Jones’ analysis about the properties
of a particular class of endogenous growth models but, because the secular increases in R&D and education are treated as exogenous data, our understanding
of the evidence in Figure 1 remains incomplete.
We propose a simple explanation for Figure 1, in which rising R&D and educational attainment are endogenous responses to a change in the economic envi1
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FIGURE 1. R&D, education and economic performance in the US. For sources, see
the appendix.

environment, and in which the growth rate of income declines despite the rise in
knowledge-creating inputs. We construct a quality ladders model that incorporates learning in the spirit of much earlier work by Young (1991, 1993), Lucas
(1993), and Parente (1994). New product generations raise the quality of a product line, but firms can further raise the quality of any given generation at a rate
that depends on their employment of skilled labor and the complexity of the
technology they are using. Our explanation for the data is that a secular increase
in complexity in the latter half of the 20th century has made passive learning
more difficult. In response, firms increased their demand for skilled labor, part of
which was to be engaged in applied R&D, and part in white-collar productionrelated employment. The increased demand for skill raised the returns to educa2

tion, which in turn induced a rise in education attainment. Consequently, our
explanation also is consistent with a rise in the returns to schooling and in the
skill premium.
Kaboski (2001) developed an assignment model in which heterogeneous workers
are assigned to a continuum of tasks that increase in complexity over time at a
constant rate. More educated workers have a comparative advantage in complex
tasks, and all workers seek more education as task complexity rises. Calibrating
this model to the entire 20th century experience, Kaboski is able to mimic some
demanding empirical patterns, most notably the fall and then rise of both wage
inequality and the returns to schooling over the century, at the same time that
educational attainment is rising everywhere in the distribution. To accomplish
this, however, Kaboski had to construct a complex model in which not only rising
task complexity, but also falling fertility and rising life expectancy drive the data.
We have fewer ambitions for our model, but we are able to explain Figure 1 with
a simple, transparent framework.
One implication of our model is that it may generate a very different future from
that implied by Jones’ (2002), analysis, which contains some unpleasant arithmetic. Applying traditional growth accounting techniques, Jones concludes that rising input intensity accounts for 80 percent of post-war growth. Eventually, the
secular increases in R&D intensity and educational attainment must end. When
they do, income growth can be expected to decline dramatically, perhaps to no
more than one-fifth of its post-war trend. What happens out of sample in our
model depends of course upon the future behavior of complexity. Our model explains the data as a response to a one-time increase in complexity that slowly
diffuses through the economy as firms gradually adopt new product generations
that embody the new basic technology. If this is more or less what has been happening, then our model generates some pleasant arithmetic: inevitable future declines in the growth of R&D intensity and educational attainment need not presage a decline in the growth rate of income.
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Our theory rests on some precise assumptions, and it is worth fixing ideas on
these directly: technology has become more complex over time; learning by doing
is more difficult in complex environments; and skill is more valuable in complex
learning environments. None of these assumptions seems particularly contentious,
but it turns out to be quite difficult to produce direct evidence for them. We do
not have any easy way to measure complexity, and attempts to measure rates of
passive learning have proved to be rather unreliable (Mishina, 1999; Lazonick
and Brush, 1985; Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen, 2000; Thompson, 2001). Nonetheless, there is a body of indirect evidence consistent with our assumptions, which
is briefly reviewed here.
A. Learning and complexity
Jovanovic and Nyarko’s (1995) Bayesian model of learning is perhaps the bestknown study of the interaction between complexity and learning. They define
complexity in terms of the number of independent tasks that must be undertaken
in the production process. Their model predicts that in more complex technologies there will be more to learn, but the rate of learning is slower. Parameter estimates obtained from fitting their model to a dozen data sets are consistent with
these predictions. In a series of papers (Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990; Darr,
Argote and Epple, 1995; Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991), Argote, Epple and
colleagues obtained similar results from estimating learning curves from three distinct activities – the operation of pizza franchises, an automotive assembly plant,
and wartime shipbuilding. Figure 2 plots the learning curves implied by their parameter estimates. 1 If we are willing to entertain the notion that shipbuilding is a

1

Epple and Argote assume that knowledge rises log-linearly with cumulative output and

declines as a function of time. They interpret their results as evidence of organizational
forgetting. Thompson (2004) has argued that forgetting may be a spurious result of assuming a learning curve in which, absent forgetting, productivity must rise without
bound. In Figure 2 we simply plot the predicted productivity levels implied by the regression estimates.
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FIGURE 2. Learning curves from three industries. Curves plot the
function qt/q*, where qt=Ktγ, Kt=λKt−1+1. and q*=(1−λ)γ. Parameter estimates are: γ=0.71, λ=0.93 for shipbuilding (from Argote,
Beckman and Epple, 1990, table 1, column 1); γ=0.28, λ=0.92 for
automotive assembly (from Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991, table 1,
column 4); γ=0.104, λ=0.80 for pizza franchises (from Darr, Argote
and Epple, 1995, table 1, column 4).

more complex task than automotive assembly, and automotive assembly is more
complex than operating a pizza franchise, the learning curves yield half-lives of
learning consistent with the predictions of Jovanovic and Nyarko.
Our ranking of Argote and Epple’s three technologies is inevitably subjective.
Unfortunately, Jovanovic and Nyarko’s inferences about the relative complexity
of different activities are even more problematic for our purposes, as they are obtained from the learning curves themselves. Galbraith (1990) took perhaps a
more objective approach by allowing senior project engineers learning to work
with new technologies to evaluate their complexity. He studied 32 instances in
which high-technology companies transferred core manufacturing technology to
plants located at least 100 miles from where the technology was originally in use.
The senior project engineer at each recipient location was asked to rate on a five-
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point scale the complexity of the transferred technology relative to the recipient’s
existing technologies. Galbraith shows that the time it took the recipient site to
reach the level of productivity at the donor site increased significantly with the
complexity of the technology, even controlling for an initial loss in productivity
that was higher in the more complex transfers. An increase of one on the fivepoint scale led to an increase in the initial productivity loss of about 16.7% and
an increase in the recovery time of the lost productivity of about 15 percent.
B. Skill and Learning
An extensive literature on wage inequality and technology is consistent with our
assumption that skilled labor has an advantage in learning more complex technologies and that, as technology became more complex in recent decades, the returns to education and unobservable skills have increased. As Figure 3 shows,
there has been a marked increase in the college wage premium despite the concurrent rise in the relative supply of college graduates.
This sharp rise in the return to schooling (see also Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, 1990; Katz and Murphy, 1992), in the premium for unobserved ability
(Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997), and in the premium for observable indicators of cognitive ability (Murnane, Willet and Levy,
1995) are all consistent with our assertion that education and ability have become more valuable as complexity has increased. Evidence that earnings profiles
are steeper for educated workers (Psacahropoulos and Layard, 1979; Knight and
Sabot, 1981; Altonji and Dunn, 1995; Altonji and Pierret, 1997; Brunello and
Comi, 2004; Low et al., 2004) is consistent with our assertion that educated
workers are more able to learn.
If newer technologies are more complex than older technologies, our assumptions
imply a positive correlation between wages and use of new technology, and this is
again consistent with empirical evidence. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) document an increased demand for skilled labor during the last five decades, and especially since 1970. They argue that the diffusion of computers and related
6
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FIGURE 3. The college wage premium and the relative supply of college graduates. Source: Acemoglu (2002).

technologies contributed significantly to this phenomenon and show that skill upgrading occurred more rapidly in industries that are computer intensive. Berman,
Bound and Griliches (1994) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) find large
within–industry increases in the share of non-production workers in manufacturing, both in the US and in a sample of OECD countries, despite the rise in their
relative wages during the 1980s and 1990s. They also show that the increase in
the share of non-production workers is associated with R&D and computer investment. Allen (2001), focusing on the timeframe 1979-1989, shows that wage
gaps by schooling increased the most in industries with rising R&D intensity and
accelerating growth in the capital-labor ratio.2

2

Further evidence relating the wage structure to technology use can be found in Krueger

(1993), Dunne and Schmitz (1995), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Thompson
(2003).
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Despite the wealth of wage data consistent with our assertions, we must acknowledge that the evidence is only circumstantial. Rising wage inequality is also
predicted by models in which skilled individuals have an advantage simply in
adopting or working with new technologies (Caselli, 1999; Galor and Moav; 2000,
Lloyd-Ellis, 2002). Chari and Hopenhayn (1993) predict that workers employed
on newer technologies will exhibit steeper earnings profiles, even though all workers learn at the same rate. R&D intensive industries, and industries and plants
using newer technologies are likely to be more capital intensive, and capital-skill
complementarity may be sufficient to explain their higher wages.

The Model
Models that combine R&D, new product generations and within-generation learning have tended to be rather complicated. As a result, they have also tended to
be rather stylized. We do not depart from that “tradition” here. After laying out
the model, we present our analysis in four parts. In sections A and B, we assume
that skilled labor is in fixed supply. Section A characterizes the steady state,
while Section B describes the dynamic responses of income and the skill premium
to a one-time increase in complexity that affects each firm after it has adopted
their its product generation. Sections C and D allow the supply of skill to respond endogenously to changes in demand.
A representative agent’s intertemporal utility is given by
∞

U =

∫e

−ρt

ln D(t )dt ,

(1)

0

where
1

D(t ) =  ∫ q (i, t )1/ θ x (i, t )(θ−1)/ θ di 
 0


θ /(θ −1)

,

(2)

is a quality-adjusted Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index defined over a continuum
of goods of unit mass. The parameter q(i,t) is an index of the quality of good i,
while x(i,t) denotes its quantity.
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The familiar Euler equation,
E (t )
= r (t ) − ρ ,
E (t )

(3)

where E(t) is the agent’s nominal expenditure on consumption goods, solves the
consumer’s intertemporal optimization problem. Nominal expenditure is the numeraire, so that r(t)=ρ, and instantaneous consumer demands satisfy
x (i, t ) =

q(i, t )p(i, t )−θ

∫

1
0

q(i, t )p(i, t )1−θ di

.

(4)

Production is carried out by unskilled labor, one unit of which produces one unit
of output. Let wu(t) be the wage of the unskilled. Each good is produced by a
monopolistic firm i which chooses a constant markup over marginal cost, setting
a price p(i,t)=wu(t)θ/(θ−1), and consequently facing demand
x (i, t ) =

(θ − 1)α(i, t )
,
θwu (t )

(5)

1

where α(i, t ) = q(i, t )/ ∫ q(i, t )di = q (i, t )/ Q(i, t ) is the relative quality of firm i’s
0

product. Let (1−s(t)) denote the supply of unskilled workers, and G(α,t) the distribution of relative quality. Full employment of unskilled workers requires that
1

(θ − 1)
1 − s(t ) =
αdG (α, t )
θwu (t ) ∫0

=

which

identifies

(θ − 1)
,
θwu (t )
the

(6)
wage,

wu(t)=(θ−1)/(θ(1−s(t))),

product

demands,

x(i,t)=α(i,t)(1−s(t)), and profits from manufacturing, π(i,t)= α(i,t)/θ.
New generations of the product arrive to each firm randomly according to an exogenous Poisson process with mean intensity µ. Let α(i, t ) denote the relative
quality of the current generation of i’s product line. If the firm’s next generation

arrives at time t , it yields an improvement in relative quality of magnitude λ. In
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the absence of any other sources of quality change, it is then easy to verify that
firm i’s relative quality evolves according to the shot noise process

d α(i, t ) = −α(i, t )g(t )dt + dq(i, t ) ,

(7)

where g(t ) = Q(t )/Q(t ) , and dq(i,t) is a Poisson process with mean intensity µ
and magnitude λ. However, while manufacturing any generation of product, the
firm may further enhance its relative quality by employing skilled labor. Let s(i,t)
denote firm i’s employment of skilled labor. A fraction γ of this skilled labor is
employed in formal R&D efforts while the remaining 1−γ is employed in management and related supervisory tasks. Skilled labor in either activity secures increases in relative quality by resolving quality control problems, making minor
improvements in product design, and so on. We assume that if s(i,t) skilled
workers are employed for the interval dt, they secure an increase in relative qualβ

ity of (s(i, t ) + φ ) dt . Here, φ measures the ease of learning: a reduction in φ im-

plies a smaller increment to relative quality for any given s, and it raises the
marginal productivity of skilled labor. The evolution of firm i’s relative quality
therefore satisfies
β

d α(i, t ) = −α(i, t )g(t )dt + (s(i, t ) + φ ) dt + dq(i, t )

(8)

At each point in time, the firm must choose how much skilled labor to employ.
The marginal value product of s(i,t) is
∞

v

β −1 −ρ (v −t )− ∫t g (y )dy

θ −1 ∫ β (s(i, t ) + φ )

e

dv .

(9)

t

The immediate increment to relative quality brought about by an increase in
β −1

s(i,t) is β (s(i, t ) + φ )

; multiplying this by θ−1 gives the immediate contribution

to profits. The contribution decays as a result of continued growth elsewhere in
the economy, and it decays in present value because of discounting. The firm
chooses s(i,t) at each point in time so that (9) equals the wage, ws(t) of the
skilled:
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1

v

1−β
∞
 β ∫ e −ρ(v −t )− ∫t g (y )dydv 

s(i, t ) =  t
−φ.


θws (t )




(10)

Note that s(i,t) does not depend on α(i,t). Hence s(i,t)=s(t), and (10) also defines
the aggregate demand for skill. For a given set of parameters, (6) and (10) therefore define wages of the skilled and unskilled.
A. The steady state with a fixed supply of skills

Assume for the moment that s(t ) = s . In the steady state, the growth rate of the
economy is fixed. Let this growth rate be g. Then (10) simplifies to


β
s = 
 θ(ρ + g )w

1

1−β

−φ.

s

(11)

Measuring wage inequality by the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, from (6) and
(11) we have
ω=

ws
β(1 − s )
=
.
wu
(θ − 1)(ρ + g )(s + φ)1−β

(12)

which for given g is decreasing in s and φ. Using (8), it is easy to show that
β
dq(i, t ) = Q(t ) (s + φ) dt + dq(i, t ) . Integrating over i and dividing by Q(t)dt


yields g = (s + φ)β + λµ , and hence
ω=

β(1 − s )
(θ − 1) ((ρ + λµ)(s + φ)1−β + (s + φ))

(13)

Comparing across steady states, an increase in complexity (i.e. a reduction in φ)
is associated with a decline in the growth rate and an increase in wage equality.
Because the supply of skilled labor is for the moment held fixed, a change in φ
has no consequence for the intensity of R&D (equal to γs ).
For any discussion of the skill premium to be interesting, we require that (13)
exceed unity at s = 0 , which requires that the parameters satisfy the restriction
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(θ − 1) <

β
.
(ρ + λµ)φ1−β + φ

(14)

If this inequality is not satisfied, then unskilled labor employed in production is
always more valuable than skilled labor used in advancing knowledge. In the remainder of the paper, we assume (14) holds.
Although the model is highly stylized, it generates a well-behaved steady state
with a stationary cross-sectional distribution for the firm size. Because it is incidental to the main focus of the paper, this distribution is derived in the appendix.
B. Transition dynamics with a fixed supply of skills

Although changes in the supply of skills over time are an essential part of our
story, it is easier and therefore useful to explore first the transitional adjustment
of wages and economic growth to an increase in complexity when skills are held
in fixed supply. Imagine at some arbitrary time 0 that a new more complex technological paradigm emerges. After this time, any new product generations
adopted by firms embody a technology in which the ease of learning, φ, is reduced, say to φ ' . Let s(t; φ) and s(t; φ ') denote the resulting demands for skilled
labor by firms that have the new and old technologies. At time t, a fraction
1 − e −µt of firms are engaged with the new paradigm, while the remainder have

yet to switch. Thus, aggregate growth is

(

g(t ) = (1 − e −µt ) λµ + (s(t; φ ') + φ ')

β

) + e (λµ + (s(t; φ) + φ) ) .
−µt

β

(15)

Derivation of the growth rate along the transition path is straightforward. From
(10), we note that s(t; φ ') + φ ' = s(t; φ) + φ for all t. Full employment of skilled
labor further requires that (1 − e −µt )(s(t; φ ') + φ ') + e −µt (s(t ; φ) + φ ) = s . Combining these expressions with (15) yields
β

g(t ) = λµ + (s + e −µt φ + (1 − e −µt ) φ ') ,

(16)
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which, as is often the case, is a function of an exponentially-weighted average of
the old and new steady states. The growth rate declines monotonically along the
transition path, and it is easy to establish that it does so at a declining rate.
We can also readily obtain an approximation to the transition path of the skill
premium. Rewrite (11) for firms using technologies with complexity φ,
1


1−β
β
 .
s(t; φ) + φ = 
 θ(ρ + g(t ))ws (t )

(17)

Substituting the relationships between s(t; φ) , s(t; φ ') , and s , along with (6) and
(16) yields

ω(t ) =

β(1 − s )
(1−β )/ β

(θ − 1) (ρ + g(t ))(g(t ) − λµ )

.

(18)

where g(t) is given by (16). As g(t) declines monotonically, it is clear that the
skill premium rises monotonically to its new steady state. Although g(t) approaches its new steady state at a declining rate, the time path of w(t) may either be strictly concave or S-shaped. 3

3

∫t

Note
∞

that

(17)

(

is
v

not

exact.

The

term

(ρ + g (t ))−1

is

the

integral

of

)

exp −ρ(v − t ) − ∫ g (y )dy dv under the assumption that g is constant, whereas it is
t

in fact declining monotonically. Thus, in reality, ω will somewhat exceed the level indicated by (18) along the transition path. With g(t) given by (16), the integral does not
exist in closed form.
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C. Endogenous supply of skills

We now replace the representative agent with a continuum of agents with a constant death rate δ. When an agent dies, she is immediately replaced by a new
agent. Upon birth, new agents can choose to pay a cost, c, to obtain education.
Each agent has ability ξ∈[0,1], which is a draw from the uniform distribution. If
the cost is paid, and the agent chooses to train, she becomes skilled with probability ξ, and remains unskilled otherwise. Indirect utility is separable in expenditure, so the agent is concerned only to make the education choice that maximizes
the discounted present value of her lifetime earnings. As an unskilled worker, this
is

∞

∫0

e −(ρ +δ )t wu (t )dt .

Restricting attention to the steady state with constant wages, the expected lifetime earnings of an unskilled worker is wu/(ρ+δ). For a worker with ability ξ, expected earnings are −c+(1− ξ)wu/(ρ+δ)+ ξws/(ρ+δ) if she chooses to train. Given
these payoffs, workers with ability greater than ξ* = c(ρ + δ)/(ws − wu ) , choose
to

c,

pay
1

and

∫ξ * ξd ξ = 2 (1 − (ξ*) ) .
1

2

the

corresponding

supply

of

skilled

workers

is

Using (6), (11), and g = (s + φ)β + λµ in the expression

for ξ * , we find that the steady-state supply of skilled labor is the smaller of the
two solutions to the fixed point expression


1 
s * = 1 −
2 


c 2 (ρ + δ)2

((

β

θ ( ρ +λµ )(s * +φ )1−β +(s * +φ ))

− θ(1θ−−s1*)



,
2




)

(19)

if the smallest solution is positive, and zero otherwise. The solution lies in the
interval [0,½], and it is easily verified that this is decreasing in φ. Hence, an increase in complexity, as expected, raises the steady-state supply of skilled labor
(and also R&D effort). As we have seen, g declines in response to an increase in
complexity when s is fixed. This decline is now at least partially offset by a rise
in s. To see what the steady-state growth rate is, we can replace s with
(g − λµ)1/ β − φ in (19), to obtain
14



1 
g = φ + 1 −
2 


c 2 (ρ + δ)2

((

β

θ ( ρ +λµ )g

1−β

+g )

− θ(1−θ −g 1+φ)



,
2




)

(20)

where g = (g − λµ)1/ β . Equation (20) holds whenever an interior solution to (19)
exists; otherwise, g = φ . In both cases, a reduction in φ unambiguously reduces g
(and hence g). Hence, the induced increase in s is never sufficient to offset fully
the direct growth-reducing effect of a decline in φ.
D. Transition dynamics with an endogenous supply of skills

When a technological revolution reduces φ, there can be no immediate response
in skill supply. Existing workers have already chosen their training, and they are
replaced only gradually, at the rate δdt, by new workers that have yet to choose
whether to undertake training. Without an increase in skilled wages, there can be
no increase in supply, so the short-term response to a reduction in φ, must be an
increase in the skill premium as the new technological paradigm diffuses through
the economy. The skilled wage increase induces a greater fraction of new workers
to seek training, and so the supply of skilled workers gradually rises. Our assumption that R&D employment is proportional to s implies that R&D intensity
also rises. The increased supply of skilled labor will mute the increased wage inequality, and moderate the demand for education. Because a grater fraction of the
new workers is choosing education, the supply of unskilled workers must decline
with time. Hence, the wages of unskilled workers rise over time. Thus, the shortterm response to an increase in complexity is to overshoot the long-run equilibrium change in wage inequality. The aggregate growth rate also overshoots its
new long-run equilibrium. A reduction in φ gradually reduces the growth rate as
more and more firms are affected. Part of this decline is eventually offset by the
increased skilled labor supply.
Noting that s(t ) = 21 δ (1 − (ξ *)2 ) − δs(t ) , we can derive an approximation for the
evolution of skilled labor under the assumption that new workers choose their
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education myopically on the basis of the current skill premium. Letting
φ(t ) = e −µt φ + (1 − e −µt )φ ' , we can therefore write


c 2 (ρ + δ)2
δ
s(t ) = 1 −
β
2 
− θ(1θ−−s1(t ))
θ(( ρ +λµ )(s (t )+φ(t ))1−β +(s (t )+φ(t )))


(



 − δs(t ) .
2




(21)

)

β

The aggregate growth rate satisfies g(t ) = λµ + (s(t ) + e −µt φ + (1 − e −µt ) φ ') , and
wages satisfy (6) and (10). Column A of Figure 3 provides representative plots
for parameter values satisfying (14).4 The overshooting of skilled wages and
growth are clearly evident. For comparison, column B plots the corresponding
transition dynamics when skilled labor is in fixed supply.

Conclusions
In this paper we offer an explanation for the paradox presented by the coexistence of secular increases in R&D expenditure and educational attainment with
no corresponding increases in per capita income growth. As Jones (2002) pointed
out, these observations are inconsistent with most endogenous growth models.
We construct a quality-ladders model in which new product generations arrive
stochastically at an exogenous rate. Formal R&D and learning by doing influence
the productivity of the new product. We claim that passive learning became more
difficult during the latter half of the 20th century, as a result of the increased
complexity of the technologies that firms have to work with. In this setting, falling per capita income growth, rising R&D expenditure and rising educational
attainment are shown to be equilibrium responses to greater complexity.

4

The values used in the figure are: φ=.1, φ’=.05, c=3, ρ=.03, δ=.01, β=.8, λ=.05, µ=.1,

θ=3.
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FIGURE 4. Dynamic responses to a reduction in φ.

Appendix
The steady-state distribution of firm size. Let α(i,0) denote the initial relative quality of
firm i. If firm i were never to launch a new product generation, α(i,t) would evolve according to the differential equation
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α(i, t ) = −α(i, t )g + (s + φ)β .

The backward solution is
t

α(i, t ) = α(i, 0)e −gt + ∫ (s + φ)β e −g (t −s )ds
0

= α(i, 0)e −gt +

(1 − e −gt )(s + φ)β
,
g

where g = λµ + (s + φ)β . In the steady state, as t → ∞ , this contribution to i’s relative
quality therefore has mean (s + φ)β /(λµ + (s + φ)β ) and zero variance.
In addition, however, firm i experiences Poisson jumps of intensity µ and magnitude λ,
the contribution of each of which decays at the exponential rate g. Let τj(i) denote the
arrival time of the jth product generation for firm i, and let n(i,t) denote the number of
new product generations that have been launched by firm i by time t. At time t, the current contribution to relative quality of a product generation of vintage t−τ is λe −g (t −τ ) .
Then, including the first and all subsequent product generations yields
α(i, t ) = α(i, 0)e −gt +

where x j (i, t ) = λe

−g (t −τ j (i ))

(1 − e −gt )(s + φ)β n (i,t )
+ ∑ x j (i, t ) ,
g
j =1

. The τj(i) are i.i.d. random variables, uniformly distributed on

[0,t]. Using the method of transformations to obtain the pdf of x, we have
(gxt )−1, λe −gt ≤ x ≤ λ
.
f (x , t ) = 
otherwise
0,

The characteristic function for x is
λ

φx (s, t ) =

∫

ˆ

e isx (gxt )−1dx

λe−gt
λ

=

∫

λe−gt

λ

cos(sx )(gxt )−1dx + iˆ ∫ sin(sx )(gxt )−1dx ,
λe−gt

where iˆ = −1 . The second inequality comes from Euler’s formula. Let z(i,t) denote the
contribution of all product generations except the first. As the τj are i.i.d., the characteristic function for z(i,t) is simply the expectation of the n(i,t)-fold product of φx(s,t), where
n(i,t) is a Poisson r.v. with mean µt.

18

φz (s, t ) = E φx (s, t )n (i,t ) 
φx (s, t )n (µt )n e −µt
n!
n =0
∞

=∑

= e µt [φx (s,t )−1] .
∞

The last line used the series expansion e y = ∑ n =0 y n / n ! . The kth moment is found by
differentiating φz(s,t) k times with respect to s, multiplying by −iˆk , and evaluating the
resulting expression at s=0:

m1 (z ) = E [z (i, t )] =

λµ
(1 − e gt )
g

λ 2 µ(g + 2µ) − λ 2 µ2e −gt − λ 2 µe −2gt (g − 2µ)
m2 (z ) = E z (i, t )2  =
.
2g 2

Letting t → ∞ , the steady-state mean and variance of z are
β

limt →∞ E (z (i, t ))

β

2

= λµ /(λµ + (s + φ) ) and limt →∞ var(z (i, t )) = λ µ /(2(λµ + (s + φ) )) . Finally, adding in

the current contribution of the first product generation, we have
limt →∞ E (α(i, t )) =

(s + φ)β
λµ
+
=1
β
λµ + (s + φ)
λµ + (s + φ)β

and
limt →∞ var(α(i, t )) =

λ2µ
.
2(λµ + (s + φ)β )

As neither moment depends on initial conditions, these expressions are also the
moments of the steady-state cross-sectional distribution. From the relations between
α(i,t), profits, and demands given in the main text, we conclude that the limiting distributions of relative quality, profits, and firm size are stationary, with finite variance. Having already established that λµ + (s + φ)β is increasing in φ, it is easy to see that the
variance of firm size increases complexity.
Sources of data for Figure 1. Expenditure on non federal R&D as a percentage of GDP

for 1953-2002 is taken from the National Patterns of R&D resources: 2002 provided by
National

Science

Foundation,

Division

of

Science

Resource

Statistics

at

http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind04/c4/fig04-05.xls .
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The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D for the period 1950-1980 are
taken from Jones (2002), and for the rest of the series (1981-1999) an estimate of the
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D is taken from the National Patterns
of

R&D

Resources:

2002

provided

by

the

National

Science

Foundation

at

http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf03313/tables/tab8.xls. Missing data are derived from averages of adjacent years. Labor force data are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The number of scientists and engineers engaged in non federal R&D is estimated as in
Ha and Howitt (2005), being equal to overall scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
multiplied by non federal R&D/ total R&D expenditure.
Average years of educational attainment in the population among persons 25 years
and older are from Jones for 1950-1980. The remaining years are estimated using Jones’
method. The US Census Bureau reports interval data on educational attainment at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-1.xls. In computing the average we assume that every person in a given interval had schooling equal to the interval
mean. Persons that have four or more years of college are assumed to have 4 years.
GDP per worker in 1996 dollars is from the Penn World Data for the period 19502000 and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrel/
gdpnewsrelease.htm) for 2001-2003. To estimate Real GDP per hour we take data on
Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 Chained Dollars (1950-2003) from the Bureau of
Economic

Analysis,

the

National

Income

and

Product

http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y.

Accounts

Table

Employment

data of civilian population of age 16 and older are from Jones for 1950-1979 and from
Labor Force Statistics (Current Population Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics) at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsatabs.htm for the rest of the series. Average weekly hours of
production are from the Current Population Survey (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/
empsit.ceseeb2.txt). Assuming an average work load of 50 weeks a year we estimate the
total number of hours worked in the economy and real GDP per hour.
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